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OBSCURITY BY DESIGN 
Woodrow Hartzog* and Frederic Stutzman**  
Abstract: Design-based solutions to confront technological privacy threats are becoming 
popular with regulators. However, these promising solutions have left the full potential of 
design untapped. With respect to online communication technologies, design-based solutions 
for privacy remain incomplete because they have yet to successfully address the trickiest 
aspect of the Internet—social interaction. This Article posits that privacy-protection 
strategies such as “Privacy by Design” face unique challenges with regard to social software 
and social technology due to their interactional nature. 
This Article proposes that design-based solutions for social technologies benefit from 
increased attention to user interaction, with a focus on the principles of “obscurity” rather 
than the expansive and vague concept of “privacy.” The main thesis of this Article is that 
obscurity is the optimal protection for most online social interactions and, as such, is a 
natural locus for design-based privacy solutions for social technologies. To that end, this 
Article develops a model of “obscurity by design” as a means to address the privacy 
problems inherent in social technologies and the Internet. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Privacy by design, that is, “the philosophy and approach of 
embedding privacy into the design specifications of various 
technologies,” promises to alter the law’s largely reactive approach to 
privacy threats.1 Government and industry are gradually embracing 
privacy by design and other design-based strategies to protect Internet 
users.2 To ensure wide applicability, the Privacy by Design approach 
offers little domain-specific guidance. However, with the growth of the 
Internet and social technologies, designing usable and effective privacy 
for technologically mediated social interaction (such as the interaction 
afforded by social media) is an urgent challenge, one deserving of 
investigation. 
                                                     
1. ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 1 (2009), available at http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/ 
Resources/privacybydesign.pdf [hereinafter CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN]; see ANN 
CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2009), available at 
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf [hereinafter 
CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES]. 
2. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); Report of the Art. 29 Data Protection 
Working Party and Working Party on Police and Justice on The Future of Privacy at 3, (Dec. 1, 
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf; 
FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/ 
120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY].  
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Over the past forty years, regulators and technologists have expended 
significant effort managing the privacy risk inherent in the collection and 
storage of personal information.3 In the era of social media and 
behavioral tracking, the vast databases (i.e., “big data”) that store 
personal information pose significant threats, but these databases and 
their parent organizations are far from the only threat to privacy on the 
Internet. The growth of the social web has demonstrated that information 
sharing inherent in the management of online relationships through 
social media present their own privacy challenges. As billions of 
individuals participate in social media, the vast amount of information 
disclosed and transferred between individuals—an inherent requirement 
for social interaction online—poses a new class of privacy threat that 
should be addressed through design.4 
Addressing the vexing privacy problems of the social web is a 
challenging task. Few can agree on a conceptualization of privacy,5 
much less how to protect privacy in our social interactions by design.6 
There are a number of practical reasons why privacy by design has 
avoided the social side of the user interface. The translation of regulation 
to implementation is a complex process and may be more efficient when 
applied to formal technologies (e.g., databases, protocols).7 Additionally, 
there is little guidance regarding how designers should approach the 
implementation of privacy by design in a contextually variant, 
interactional space. Many substantive protections entailed in privacy by 
design are effectuated on the “back end” of technologies, such as data 
                                                     
3. ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY, Version 1.91 (2012), 
available at bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf. 
4. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2007); danah boyd, Why Youth 
(Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, 
IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 133 (David Buckingham ed., 2008); Lauren Gelman, Privacy, 
Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315 (2009); James 
Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009); Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross & 
Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The Evolution of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, J. 
PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY, 2012, at 7, available at http://repository.cmu.edu/jpc/vol4/iss2/2/. 
5. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 4; ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Stephen T. 
Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s Theories of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 411 (2003). 
6. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1409, 1421 
(2011) (“Privacy by design is an amorphous concept.”); Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, 
Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, (New 
York Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-43, 2012), available at 
https://www.privacyassociation.org/media/pdf/events_and_programs/Privacy%20by%20Design-
A%20Counterfactual%20Analysis.pdf. 
7. Seda Gürses, Carmela Troncoso & Claudia Diaz, Address at the Computers, Privacy & Data 
Prot. Annual Conference: Engineering Privacy by Design (Jan. 29-30, 2011). 
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security through encryption, data minimization techniques, anonymity, 
and structural protection though organizational prioritization of privacy.8 
However, the design of social technologies must consider “front end” 
privacy concerns such as privacy settings, search visibility, password 
protections, and the ability to use pseudonyms.9 
The answer to these challenges might lie in refining the goal for the 
design of social technologies. The current goal of design solutions is 
“privacy,” which is too broad and opaque to provide meaningful 
guidance in designing social technologies. Indeed, one conceptualization 
of privacy, secrecy, can be seen as antithetical to the notion of social 
interaction. This Article recommends looking to the related concept of 
obscurity. Empirical evidence demonstrates that Internet users aim to 
produce and rely upon obscurity to protect their social interaction 
online.10 The concept of online “obscurity,” defined here as a context in 
which information is relatively difficult to find or understand, is a much 
more defined and attainable goal for social technology designers. 
Obscurity is more flexible than some conceptualizations of privacy and 
also more feasible to implement. Moreover, obscurity involves more 
than prohibitions on conduct; internet users can actively produce 
obscurity themselves. 
The main thesis of this Article is that obscurity is an optimal 
protection for social interaction online and, as such, is a useful concept 
and design pattern when addressing front-end (i.e., user-facing) privacy 
concerns. Therefore, the purpose of this Article is to introduce and 
develop the concept of “obscurity by design” as a model for design-
based privacy solutions in social technologies. In doing so, we provide 
organizations who wish to embrace privacy-protective design principles 
with a useful set of tools for approaching these interactional privacy 
concerns. 
Part I of this Article reviews the broader concept of privacy by 
design, including its strengths, the challenges to its implementation, and 
its missed opportunity in failing to account for the front-end design of 
social technologies. Part II sets forth our conceptualization of obscurity, 
including the four major factors of online obscurity: (1) search visibility, 
                                                     
8. See GELLMAN, supra note 3.  
9. See Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social Media, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2012 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 
769 (2012), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id= 2145320&bnc=1 [hereinafter Stutzman 
& Hartzog, Boundary Regulation]; Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online 
Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity]. 
10. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9. 
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(2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. This Article 
proposes that the four factors of online obscurity constitute a set of 
principles that designers should consider when building privacy into 
social technologies. Finally, Part III proposes a model to implement 
obscurity by design. This model suggests that obscurity by design can be 
effectuated through a combination of technologies, policies, and 
behavioral interventions. 
I.  PRIVACY BY DESIGN MUST BE CLARIFIED TO APPLY TO 
THE USER INTERFACE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
In recent years, consumer technologies have embraced the broad 
collection and storage of personal information. Behavioral advertising, 
consumer forecasting, and geolocational systems have pushed—and 
created new—boundaries for the collection of data about users.11 While 
many industries argue that increased data will lead to better products and 
predictions,12 the collection and storage of this data potentially opens 
consumers and companies to novel risk. 
Early approaches to protect the information and privacy rights of 
consumers were to punish violators by utilizing torts, statutes, and 
regulations to levy fines and injunctions.13 These “reactive” approaches 
remain in use, but the challenges of web-scale technologies, and the 
scale of risks such as breach or hacking, require a proactive approach to 
privacy protection.14 These modern “design-based” solutions to privacy 
                                                     
11. See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2; FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY 
DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY 
DISCLOSURES] (“[M]obile devices can reveal precise information about a user’s location that could 
be used to build detailed profiles of consumer movements over time and in ways not anticipated by 
consumers. Indeed, companies can use a mobile device to collect data over time and ‘reveal[] the 
habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); Josh Halliday, Facebook Users 
Unwittingly Revealing Intimate Secrets, Study Finds, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/mar/11/facebook-users-reveal-intimate-secrets; Press 
Release, FTC, FTC to Study Data Broker Industry’s Collection and Use of Consumer Data (Dec. 
18, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/12/databrokers.shtm. 
12. See, e.g., JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT 
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2011), available at http://www. 
mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation. 
13. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON 
PRIVACY (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914271; Michael 
D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the 
Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127 (2008). 
14. See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2; Kenneth A. Bamberger & 
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011). 
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focus on concepts such as data minimization, security, information 
policy, and disclosure of information practices. This proactive approach 
to privacy has crystallized in the privacy-by-design movement, which 
seeks to build “the principles of Fair Information Practices (FIPs) into 
the design, operation and management of information processing 
technologies and systems.”15 This Part will review the history of privacy 
by design and review the challenges to its implementation in various 
contexts, notably the user interface of social media. 
A.  Privacy by Design Challenges Organizations to Rethink 
Established Approaches to Privacy 
Privacy by design can best be thought of as a technological design 
framework; when this framework is embraced in the design phase, the 
resultant technology should embody privacy protection. In this sense, 
“privacy” is not an afterthought or a security treatment, but an essential 
value in the design and construction process. 
The privacy by design movement can be traced back to Dr. Ann 
Cavoukian, the Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 
Canada.16 Cavoukian’s approach to privacy by design is illustrated in 
numerous white papers,17 as well as an edited volume of the journal 
Identity in the Information Society.18 Cavoukian’s approach to privacy 
by design argues for the inclusion of Fair Information Principles into the 
design of technologies. These principles include: 
1. Recognition that privacy interests and concerns must be addressed 
proactively; 
2. Application of core principles expressing universal spheres of 
privacy protection; 
3. Early mitigation of privacy concerns when developing information 
technologies and systems, throughout the entire information life 
cycle—end to end; 
4. Need for qualified privacy leadership and/or professional input; 
5. Adoption and integration of privacy-enhancing technologies 
                                                     
15. CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1.; see CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN 
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1; Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1421–22; Rubinstein & 
Good, supra note 6, at 1, 5–7. 
16. CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1; CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1. 
17. Rubinstein & Good, supra note 6, at 6. 
18. See generally Privacy by Design: The Next Generation in the Evolution of Privacy, 3 
IDENTITY INFO. SOC’Y 247 (2010) (special issue devoted to privacy by design), available at 
http://link.springer.com/journal/12394/3/2/page/1. 
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(PETs); 
6. Embedding privacy in a positive-sum (not zero-sum) manner so as 
to enhance both privacy and system functionality; and 
7. Respect for users’ privacy.19 
The privacy by design approach has proven to be a useful innovation 
within the design community, where emphasis is often placed on PETs 
or ex post remedies. Using a process lens, privacy by design argues that 
privacy is a critical part of the socio-technical infrastructure of 
technologies, and that privacy is both a value and a tangible component 
that must be included in technologies. To accomplish this goal, 
Cavoukian argues that privacy by design should be valued through the 
organizational hierarchy (e.g., qualified leadership) and that the privacy 
outcomes should be positive for the user.20 In a sense, privacy by design 
provides both process and infrastructure for the inclusion of privacy as 
both a value and a tangible good in the design of technical systems (as 
well as organizational practices and physical design, notes Cavoukian).21 
In reaction to failures of privacy enhancing technologies or ex post 
measures as a robust privacy strategy, privacy organizations, 
government regulators, and industry groups are moving toward privacy 
by design as a potential information-age remedy to privacy threats. In 
2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) privacy framework, 
“Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Age of Rapid Change,” strongly 
encouraged companies to adopt privacy-by-design approaches to their 
business and technical operations.22 Furthermore, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor also strongly recommended privacy by design as a 
requirement in the forthcoming data protection regulation—potentially 
requiring firms in the EU, as well as those doing business with EU firms, 
to follow privacy by design under threat of fines or other legal action.23 
The adoption of privacy by design by regulatory agencies as a guideline 
or requirement would require organizations to change the way privacy is 
treated in the process of technology design. Such a regulatory move 
                                                     
19. CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1; see CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN 
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1. 
20. See CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 3. 
21. See id. at 4–5. 
22. See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2. Privacy by design was also one of 
the “three core principles” called upon by the FTC in a recent report on mobile app privacy. FTC, 
MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 11, at 6. 
23. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Comprehensive 
Approach On Personal Data Protection in the European Union, COM (2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 
2010). 
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would be noteworthy, as there are a number of challenges to its 
implementation. 
B. Obscurity Can Improve Privacy by Design 
The adoption of privacy by design as a universal approach to privacy 
poses a set of significant challenges for implementers. General criticisms 
include a lack of incentives for the deployment of privacy by design, 
questions about its enforceability, the inherent organizational challenges 
of adopting and applying new privacy practices, and the technical 
hurdles of a privacy by design development model.24 While these 
criticisms are sharp, it is clear that privacy by design is a useful way of 
addressing the privacy challenges that technology designers face. The 
design of technology is an interdisciplinary problem that involves the 
coordination of engineers, managers, lawyers, policymakers, and 
executives within an organization. The privacy by design approach helps 
address these challenges by setting forth values that disparate parts of 
the organization can embody in the design process. Of course, this is 
often easier said than done. 
As outlined by Ira Rubinstein, two of the primary challenges facing 
privacy by design include a weak specification of the privacy by design 
approach and lack of incentives for the firm to adopt it.25 Here we 
concentrate on Rubinstein’s question of incentives. Rubinstein considers 
why firms would adopt privacy by design (as well as PETs), exploring 
endogenous motivation, market demand, and regulatory potential.26 To 
the question of endogenous motivation, firms are differentially 
motivated towards privacy based on data collected, tolerance of risk, and 
economic impact of privacy breaches. Therefore, motivation as an 
endogenous trait is not uniformly distributed across firms.27 Rubinstein 
then questions consumer valuation of privacy and PETs, arguing that 
there is little market demand for privacy goods (even non-zero-sum 
goods).28 Finally, Rubinstein explores the potential for regulatory 
enforcement, finding that regulatory capability to enforce privacy by 
design to be premature due to challenges in establishing consent orders 
based on privacy by design language.29 
                                                     
24. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 6. 
25. See id. at 1414–44. 
26. See id. at 1414–53. 
27. See id. at 1436–40. 
28. See id. at 1433–36. 
29. See id. at 1444–53. 
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As Cavoukian notes, the premise of privacy by design is to construct 
technologies that embody the principles of Fair Information Practices.30 
The roadmap to the creation of these technologies is not one that can be 
directly specified in the sense that there is a linear set of steps to follow. 
This is the specification problem described by Rubinstein.31 The design 
of a product (specifically, software) requires the translation of 
requirements (e.g., semantic descriptions of functionality) into code that 
can be compiled and executed. In the context of a software product team, 
such a translation can be facilitated when requirements are precise and 
product managers know designers’ limits and capabilities. However, 
even in the context of highly skilled teams, the requirements engineering 
phase of product design is non-trivial. With regulatory oversight of a 
process or design, new requirements engineering challenges emerge.32 
Regulatory requirements are often vague, describing a generic process 
that can apply to many different types of systems; ensuring compliance 
with such a process is often highly challenging.33 As the privacy by 
design specifications are inherently generic, translation of these 
requirements into design is a significant challenge. 
Finally, we call on Rubinstein’s taxonomy of front-end and back-end 
technologies when describing the components of a system.34 
Rubinstein’s point is clear and important—systems are multi-faceted and 
the user experience has many different components.35 Systems are 
commonly not built as a cohesive whole, but as parts that are placed 
together to accomplish a goal. It is important to think about how a 
privacy risk model varies for different components of the system. For 
example, a website might have a front end (the website itself) and a back 
end (the data store). The risk model for these two components is 
different in that privacy attacks or problems can vary substantially. A 
formal system, such as a database, has a known universe of threats that 
can be guarded systematically. A front end, on the other hand, may 
invoke a range of threats, from the social to the technical. The 
heterogeneity of these threats makes it harder to apply formal privacy 
logics, leading to a potentially greater propensity to design privacy for 
                                                     
30. See CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1. 
31. See Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1423–31. 
32. See Travis D. Breaux & Annie I. Antón, Analyzing Regulatory Rules for Privacy and Security 
Requirements, 34 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 5, 5, 17–19 (2008). 
33. See id. at 5. 
34. See Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1421–31. 
35. See id.  
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formal systems only.36 
Thus, there are many roadblocks to a large-scale adoption of privacy 
by design, such as challenges to the demand for, feasibility of, and 
technical capacity to implement this approach. This is further 
complicated by the nature of privacy, where risks are both endogenous 
(that is, the product of a known set of risks inherent to the technology) 
and exogenous (the product of external, often unknowable risks) to the 
technology.37 We see an illustration of this with social media, where 
individuals interact with systems (where endogenous risk can be 
known), as well as with other individuals (where exogenous risks 
emerge) within the system. This raises privacy challenges that have not 
been seen before in other interactive technologies. For this reason, we 
use social media as the case we examine in the remainder of this Article. 
Externally, conceptualizing privacy within the context of social 
technologies in a way that is workable for design-based solutions has 
proven elusive.38 As previously mentioned, there is no general 
agreement on what the term “privacy” means in a social context, much 
less how Internet design can protect it.39 While many scholars and 
regulators have agreed that “back end” protections, such as those 
provided for in the fair information practices,40 are critical design-based 
protections, these background safeguards fail to address the “front end” 
of the Internet, which involves user interfaces designed to facilitate 
online social interaction. 
Social interaction is messy, unpredictable, and contextual with a 
vengeance. Consequently, any design rules or guidelines seem destined 
either to be inconsistently effective or miss the mark entirely. But the 
social web is now too large to exclude from the realm of design-based 
solutions. Social network sites like Facebook have over one billion 
users.41 Even commercial and news websites are incorporating social 
aspects into their user experience.42 Thus, the time has come for design 
                                                     
36. See Gürses, Troncoso & Diaz, supra note 7; Sarah Spiekermann & Lorrie Faith Cranor, 
Engineering Privacy, 35 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 67 (2011). 
37. See Paul Dourish & Ken Anderson, Collective Information Practice: Exploring Privacy and 
Security as Social and Cultural Phenomena, 21 HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 319 (2006).  
38. See, e.g., Gelman, supra note 4; Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9. 
39. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9. 
40. The FTC has identified the major substantive principles of privacy by design as data security, 
reasonable collection limits, sound retention practices, and data accuracy. FTC, PROTECTING 
CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 22–32. 
41. See Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
42. See Community Forum, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/forum/ 
community?_encoding=UTF8&cdOpenPostBox=1 (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); Community 
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guidelines to protect privacy in this social medium. 
II. BETTER LIVING THROUGH OBSCURITY 
Most conceptualizations of privacy on the Internet seem to break 
down at the social level.43 The concept of privacy is simply too 
contextual and vague to meaningfully direct the relevant stakeholders in 
design-based decisions to protect Internet users. Instead, this Article 
proposes that general design principles to protect users of social 
technologies should be based on the concept of obscurity. The following 
section explores the concept of online obscurity, summarizing our own 
research and that of others on the topic, and why obscurity is the ideal 
front-end design principle for online communication technologies like 
social network sites. 
A.  The Concept of Obscurity 
Obscurity is defined as a state of unknowing.44 If an individual is 
obscure, this means that an observer does not possess critical 
information that allows them to make sense of the individual. This 
critical information can include the individual’s identity, social 
connections, and other personal information. Without this information, 
observers are limited in their ability to fully comprehend an observed 
person’s actions and utterances. Employees on a lunch break in a 
restaurant often gossip about their co-workers, but this gossip is obscure 
to eavesdroppers unless these outsiders know the subject of the gossip; 
those in earshot must be able to draw on unspoken contextual 
information to make sense of the utterances. This information enables 
what Erving Goffman has referred to as “presupposition.”45 Though we 
colloquially say we socialize in “public,” in truth our personal 
interactions are usually enveloped in zones of obscurity, where our 
identity and personal context are shielded to those we interact or share 
common space with. 
Social media users also have come to rely upon obscurity for privacy 
protection online. Obscurity is a natural state offline that users can draw 
upon reflexively when protecting their privacy in online social settings.46 
                                                     
Guidelines, NATION, http://www.thenation.com/community-guidelines (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
43. See, e.g., Gelman, supra note 4; Grimmelmann, supra note 4; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A 
Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005). 
44. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 5. 
45. See Erving Goffman, Felicity’s Condition, 89 AM. J. SOC. 1, 1 (1983). 
46. See, e.g., IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL 
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For example, the mere act of disclosing information online does not 
necessarily mean that the individual seeks wide publicity, even if the 
information disclosed is theoretically available to the Internet at large. 
Just as an individual shouting from the street corner will only be heard 
by so many individuals (her audience is limited by architecture, social 
interaction, and pure physics), the rational online discloser has similar 
expectations with content shared online.47 
The choice to disclose online involves a highly contextual cost/benefit 
analysis.48 Individuals control the information disclosed online by 
limiting the audience of the disclosure, by limiting the meaning of the 
disclosure, and by adapting the disclosure to a particular website.49 
Because anonymity would violate norms and limit benefits attained from 
many social network sites such as Facebook, individuals instead develop 
techniques that effectively produce obscurity in disclosure.50 As 
obscurity is a protective, privacy-enhancing state where we are guarded 
by an observer’s inability to completely comprehend our action, it is 
particularly useful to users of social media tools. 
Contrary to the powerful popular discourse that argues that 
                                                     
SPACE, TERRITORY, AND CROWDING (1975); SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: 
DIALECTICS OF DISCLOSURE (2002). 
47. For example, numerous papers have documented the characteristics of the “attention 
economy” online, where a multitude of information producers compete furiously for limited 
attention. To attain large-scale attention requires the expense of significant resources; individuals 
who do not seek, or seek limited, publicity have very good reason to expect obscurity. See, e.g., 
MARK NEWMAN, ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI & DUNCAN J. WATTS, THE STRUCTURE AND 
DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS (2006); Jon M. Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked 
Environment, 46 J. ASS’N COMPUTING MACHINERY 604 (1999). 
48. See, e.g., Joseph B. Walther, Selective Self-Presentation in Computer-Mediated 
Communication: Hyperpersonal Dimensions of Technology, Language, and Cognition, 23 
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAVIOR 2538 (2007). 
49. See, e.g., AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ADULTS AND SOCIAL 
NETWORK WEBSITES (2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/272/ 
report\_display.asp.; AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 
TEENS, PRIVACY AND ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS (2007), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/211/report\_display.asp; AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW 
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA AND YOUNG ADULTS (2010), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx; Stutzman and Hartzog, 
Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 16; Martin Tanis & Tom Postmes, Social Cues and Impression 
Formation in CMC, 53 J. COMM. 676 (2003). 
50. See Joan Morris DiMicco & David R. Millen, Identity Management: Multiple Presentations 
of Self in Facebook, in GROUP ‘07: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 INTERNATIONAL ACM 
CONFERENCE ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 383 (2007), available at http://dl.acm.org/ 
citation.cfm?id=1316682; Stutzman & Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9; see also danah 
boyd, Social Steganography: Learning to Hide in Plain Sight, ZEPHORIA (Aug. 23, 2010), 
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/08/23/social-steganography-learning-to-hide-in-
plain-sight.html. 
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individuals online have essentially different privacy and notoriety goals, 
our previous work “demonstrate[d] that online obscurity is a crucial 
aspect of privacy for Internet users.”51 Through obfuscation techniques 
and other normative user practices, it is clear that obscurity is both 
desired and expected online. “Internet users routinely hide information 
by making it invisible to search engines, using pseudonyms and multiple 
profiles, and taking advantage of privacy settings.”52 In short, users 
produce obscurity online. Thus, obscurity is the ideal locus for design-
based solutions that empower users to produce and exist in their own 
privacy protective contexts. 
B. The Four Principles of Online Obscurity 
Our previous research has offered a clear definition of online 
obscurity: “Information is obscure online if it exists in a context missing 
one or more key factors that are essential to discovery or comprehension. 
We have identified four of these factors: (1) search visibility, (2) 
unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. The presence of 
these factors diminishes obscurity, and their absence enhances it.”53 This 
Part summarizes that conceptualization with an eye toward design. 
Information can be plotted on a spectrum of obscurity that will allow 
regulators, designers, and organizational stakeholders to adopt guiding 
principles regarding the protection of online information. The aim of 
obscurity, as opposed to the broader and more intractable goal of 
“privacy,” would provide policymakers and organizational stakeholders 
with a more nuanced set of “starting points” that could be applied 
flexibly via design-based solutions across culture and context. We now 
consider how each of the four factors of obscurity can be approached 
through design. 
1.  Search Visibility 
Search visibility is the degree to which individuals and the content 
they produce are locatable and accessible through search.54 Search 
invisibility is one of the most significant factors in online obscurity 
because it is the primary method for discovering online information.55 
                                                     
51. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 16. 
52. Id. at 2. 
53. Id. at 48. 
54. See id. at 35–36. 
55. See, e.g., DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE USE 
(2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Search-Engine-Use/Data-
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Without search, information can only be discovered in less efficient 
ways such as a chain-hyperlink fashion via other websites, messages, 
and manual URL entry. 
In many ways, search invisibility is already the default for most 
online information.56 Search invisibility can be achieved by intentionally 
shielding websites from search engines using the robot.txt file as well as 
by using privacy settings or other access restrictions such as passwords, 
which are another factor in online obscurity.57 Because search is a 
primary and common vector for discovery of individual content, 
designers should consider offering controls over inclusion in both 
internal and external search services. For example, some people may 
want their profile to appear in Google, while others would prefer only to 
                                                     
Memo.aspx; SUSANNA FOX, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINES (2002), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2002/Search-Engines/Data-Memo.aspx; LEE 
RAINE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, BIG JUMP IN SEARCH ENGINE USE (2005), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2005/Big-jump-in-search-engine-use/Data-Memo.aspx; Gary 
Marchionini, Exploratory Search: From Finding to Understanding, 49 COMM. ACM 41 (2006); 
Jamie Teevan, Susan T. Dumais & Eric Horvitz, Potential for Personalization, 17 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUM. INTERACTION 1 (2010). 
56. This information, collectively known as “the dark Web,” “the deep Web” or “the invisible 
Web,” accounts for 80-99% of the World Wide Web. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BERGMAN, THE DEEP 
WEB: SURFACING HIDDEN VALUE (2001), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=jep;view=text;rgn=main;idno=3336451.0007.104 (“Since they are missing the deep Web 
when they use such search engines, Internet searchers are therefore searching only 0.03%—or one 
in 3,000—of the pages available to them today.”); Norm Medeiros, Reap What You Sow: 
Harvesting the Deep Web, 18 OCLC SYS. & SERV. 18 (2002); Yanbo Ru & Ellis Horowitz, 
Indexing the Invisible Web: A Survey, 29 ONLINE INFO. REV. 249 (2005); Andy Beckett, The Dark 
Side of the Internet, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/ 
nov/26/dark-side-internet-freenet; Danny Devriendt, Data is Gold – 91,000 Terabytes of Uncharted 
Web: Welcome to the Dark Side, PORTER NOVELLI BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011), 
http://blog.porternovelli.com/2011/04/11/data-is-gold-%E2%80%93-91000-terabytes-of-uncharted-
web-welcome-to-the-dark-side/ (“The dark Web, or hidden Web is approximately 550 times bigger 
than the Web you experience daily.”); Russell Kay, Quickstudy: Deep Web, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Dec. 15, 2005, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/107097/Deep_Web (“[M]ore 
than 500 times as much information as traditional search engines ‘know about’ is available in the 
deep Web.”); see also PAUL PEDLEY, THE INVISIBLE WEB: SEARCHING THE HIDDEN PARTS OF THE 
INTERNET (2001); CHRIS SHERMAN & GARY PRICE, THE INVISIBLE WEB: UNCOVERING 
INFORMATION SOURCES SEARCH ENGINES CAN’T SEE (2001). 
57. For example, the popular blogging service Blogger allows users to make their blog invisible 
to Google. See “Listing” and “Let Search Engines find your Blog” Settings, GOOGLE.COM, 
http://www.google.com/support/blogger/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=41373 (last visited Apr. 27, 
2011). Facebook profiles that utilize privacy settings are also not found by search engines. See How 
Can I Control if Other Search Engines can Link to My Timeline?, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/392235220834308/ (last visited May 6, 2011); see also Jonathan 
Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 102 (2008) (“Today, nearly all Web programmers 
know robots.txt is the way in which sites can signal their intentions to robots, and these intentions 
are voluntarily respected by every major search engine across differing cultures and legal 
jurisdictions.”). 
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be “searchable” one or two network degrees out (e.g., by friends-of-
friends). Designers may also consider offering various levels of search 
engine obfuscation, where only certain aspects of the profile are placed 
into search, or search placement is manipulated to raise or lower 
placement of results. Design options are discussed in greater detail in 
Part III below. 
2. Unprotected Access 
Access protection covers a range of technologies and methods for 
controlling access to content.58 A common example of an access control 
is the password. Access controls can serve multiple functions apart from 
merely technologically restricting who can view information. Access 
controls can also serve as normative signals indicating the private nature 
of the information. Conversely, unfettered access to information, 
particularly when technologies like privacy settings are available but 
unused, can have the opposite effect on obscurity, leaving the 
information exposed and subject to being scraped, indexed, and 
aggregated. 
There are many different kinds of access controls, including 
biometrics, encryption, privacy settings, and passwords. These controls 
can provide for user control over several variables, including the content 
shared, the specifics of the potential audience, or both. As ubiquitous 
computing systems change and adoption increases, dynamically 
generated access controls are likely to evolve—controls that are reactive 
to the environment and its network configurations.59 Along with search 
visibility, access controls are one of the most important factors to create 
online obscurity. Consequently, they should be considered bedrock tools 
for designers embracing the principals of obscurity. 
3. Identification 
Identification refers to the degree that individuals are identified 
through personal and interpersonal disclosures in online settings. 
Identification is defined here as the existence of an irrefutable piece of 
information that links content online to the individual’s person. 
                                                     
58. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 9, at 37–38. 
59. See, e.g., Giovanni Iachello & Jason Hong, End-User Privacy in Human-Computer 
Interaction, 1 FOUNDS. & TRENDS HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 137 (2007); Maomao Wu, 
Adaptive Privacy Management for Distributed Applications (June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Lancaster University), available at http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/12984/1/PhdThesis-
MaomaoWu.pdf.  
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Information that cannot be linked to a person offers a degree of 
anonymity and poses a reduced threat to that person’s privacy.60 While 
many PETs and other design strategies focus on anonymity,61 obscurity 
is much more concerned with the use of pseudonyms and ID variants 
given their utility in socialization. Like passwords, ID variants and 
pseudonyms can somewhat protectively de-link content and identity. 
Readily apparent ID variants and pseudonym can also signal to the 
recipient of information that the identity of the discloser is sensitive or 
private. 
Social technologies present multiple challenges to identity 
management. For example, on social network sites, where the 
articulation of the social network is a key feature, identification can 
occur through both direct and indirect disclosures.62 Users maintaining a 
pseudonymous profile may become publicly identifiable based on whom 
the individual connects to, or what a friend writes on the individual’s 
wall.63 Therefore, designers should be aware that the individual’s 
intention to protect her or his identity extends beyond self-disclosure to 
managing disclosures about the individual and selective crafting of the 
online persona. 
4. Clarity 
Finally, clarity covers the degree to which an outside observer can 
make sense of content shared by an individual.64 Often, online 
information is easily discoverable, but important aspects of that 
information do not make sense to the reader or viewer.65 Sometimes this 
information is intentionally vague or incomplete. Information in one 
domain might be separated by medium, tool, or linkage from another 
piece in order to make it more obscure, and, thus, more protected.66 If 
information is too vague or incomplete to understand, it lacks clarity.67 
                                                     
60. See Iachello & Hong, supra note 59, at 2–3. 
61. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1411, 1415. 
62. See J. Donath & d. boyd, Public Displays of Connection, 22 BT TECH. J. 71 (2004). 
63. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Remarks at the 30th IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy: De-anonymizing Social Networks (May 17–20 2009), in 2009 IEEE 
SYMPOSIUM ON SEC. & PRIVACY, 2009, at 173–87 (abstract available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ 
stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5207644&isnumber=5207632). 
64. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 39. 
65. See id. 
66. See, e.g., Stutzman & Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9. 
67. See Clarity Definition, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/ 
dictionary/american/clarity#clarity_3 (last visited May 30, 2013). 
07 - Hartzog Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2013  1:55 PM 
2013] OBSCURITY BY DESIGN 401 
 
Whereas the identification factor of obscurity focuses on the link 
between identity and information, clarity focuses on the link between 
content and some other contextual factor. Stripping context from 
information reduces its clarity and increases the obscurity of information 
by reducing the number of people who are likely to understand the 
meaning of the disclosure. This technique is common in our everyday 
social interactions. Groups that are familiar with each other can 
“presuppose” contexts in conversation, instead of explicitly providing 
for it with each disclosure.68 In our previous research, we conceptualized 
“clarity” as the “range of shared social, cultural, and linguistic factors 
that enable presupposition.”69 The previously mentioned eavesdroppers 
on gossip may be able to understand some of what is spoken aloud, but 
there will likely be a lack of clarity that prohibits true comprehension or 
identification of the conversational subjects. The same can be said for 
communication via social technologies, which is often clouded by in-
group presuppositions that inhibit clarity.70 
Designers can approach clarity by both recognizing and valuing 
individual strategies for managing clarity (i.e., respecting this normative 
practice in both policy and technology), and by considering the degree to 
which meta-data, data stores, and data recombination allows outside 
individuals to programmatically construct clarity of observed 
information.71 Such considerations are especially important given the 
risks to persons (e.g., job security, safety) that can emerge from 
inadvertent disclosures. 
Obscurity is capable of being easier to refine and implement than the 
broader concept of privacy. Where the pursuit of “privacy” in design 
often seems like a quest for near-perfect protection, the goal of designing 
for obscurity is that it be good enough for most contexts or a user’s 
specific needs. Protection is achieved via obscurity not necessarily 
through the strength of the “armor,” but rather, through a significant 
reduction in the probability of discovering or understanding information. 
Obscurity is a more nuanced and accurate reflection of the expectations 
of users of social technologies than the broader, and potentially 
misleading, concept of privacy.72 
                                                     
68. Goffman, supra note 45, at 1. 
69. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 39. 
70. See, e.g., Tanis & Postmes, supra note 49; Walther, supra note 48. 
71. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Ralph Gross & Fred Stutzman, Privacy in an Age of 
Augmented Reality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
72. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 31–40. 
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III. IMPLEMENTING OBSCURITY BY DESIGN 
This Article has proposed that obscurity is the natural state for most 
online social communications and, as such, should be the locus of 
design-based privacy solutions for social technologies. This part 
explores how the various organizational stakeholders can work together 
to create a model of “obscurity by design” for social technologies. 
Specifically, this part explores ways to implement obscurity by design 
through technologies, policies, and behavioral interventions. These 
implementations would enable and encourage users to create or maintain 
a context of obscurity. 
It is important to note the role of design and designers within this 
conceptualization. Those actually tasked with the nuts and bolts of 
assembling social technologies, such as product managers, designers, 
and software engineers, will be crucial in designing for obscurity. Given 
obscurity by design’s focus on the “front end” or user interface of social 
technologies, these design teams will play an extremely important role in 
implementing policy goals. 
But a successful scheme of privacy by design must include all of the 
relevant stakeholders in an organization, including the legal counsel who 
drafts a technology’s terms of use and privacy policy, and the higher-
level decision makers who set the goals and basic parameters of the 
technology. While different organizational stakeholders might claim 
responsibility for the ultimate implementation of various technologies, 
policies, and nudges, a true obscurity by design approach should attempt 
to bring together all of the organizational stakeholders to coordinate the 
implementation process. Indeed, complete organizational responsibility 
is one of the central tenets of privacy by design.73 
Of course, obscurity is not the only desired goal of privacy protection 
in social technologies. Some communication, like information on 
publicity-seeking blogs and some Twitter accounts, need little protection 
and are unlikely to be viewed as private or obscure in most instances. 
Obscurity would actually be a hindrance to those seeking widespread 
publicity.74 Other communications, such as sensitive health information 
and extremely intimate disclosures about personal relationships, would 
likely require more protection than obscurity, and thus the desired level 
                                                     
73. See Cavoukian, Privacy by Design, supra note 1, at 1. 
74. For those seeking to make a living by writing and publishing information, obscurity is 
actually an obstacle to overcome. See, e.g., CORY DOCTOROW, THE PROBLEM ISN’T PIRACY, THE 
PROBLEM IS OBSCURITY (Children’s Book Insider ed., 2011), available at 
http://www.write4kids.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/doctorow.pdf. 
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of protection should be confidentiality or secrecy.75 Optimally, users 
should be able to adjust their level of protection from the obscurity 
default to achieve either more publicity or greater confidentiality or 
secrecy. 
Indeed, many of the proposals to implement obscurity by design can 
also serve the interests of the more protective concepts of confidentiality 
or secrecy. Alternatively, some of these proposals can also serve as a 
transitional tool that helps ensure a gradual, controlled, and layered 
approach to publicity, rather than a meteoric ascent into fame—
metaphorical speed bumps for online communication. Thus, these 
proposals are pliable and capable of effectuating a number of different 
policy goals. 
A.  Technologies 
Perhaps the most obvious way to design for obscurity is to create 
technologies that directly produce obscurity or enable users to produce 
obscurity for themselves. These technologies can include, but are not 
limited to, PETs such as the option to hide individual content from 
internal and external search engines.76 In social media, friendship, 
follower status, or group status generally govern access. In blogs or 
websites, either credentials (such as passwords) or encryption govern 
access. Following this logic, smart hyperlinks and privacy settings could 
restrict access to various degrees and, by doing so, raise the transactional 
cost of finding information and making that information more obscure. 
Such high costs decrease the likelihood that information will be found 
and used in harmful ways. 
1. Smart Hyperlinks and Access Walls 
Consider the case where an individual would like to semi-privately 
share content without passwords or social network connections. Through 
the use of cookies, a “paywall”-like technology could be designed to 
only accept links from certain sources restricting access to content.77 For 
example, a link might not lead to the correct page unless the user clicked 
                                                     
75. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, The Privacy Box: A Software Proposal, FIRST MONDAY (Nov. 2, 
2009), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/2682/2361. 
76. See, e.g., Spiekermann & Cranor, supra note 36. 
77. Of course, paywall technologies are both controversial and subject to circumvention. But 
increasing the labor required to access information is another way to lower the probability of 
discovery. See, e.g., Tim Brookes, 5 Ways to Get Around the New York Times Paywall, 
MAKEUSEOF (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/5-ways-york-times-paywall/. 
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it while within a protected online community or if certain cookies 
existed on the user’s computer authorizing the disclosure.78 
Alternatively, the link might work only when the web server can confirm 
that the link is embedded within a certain webpage. 
These “smart hyperlinks” could help ensure that only members of the 
protected community or other verified users could access the 
information. Additionally, these links would help maintain the obscurity 
of information by frustrating the ease of dissemination online.79 Most 
links are easily shared through being cut and pasted into e-mails or 
social media postings. These smart links would require the extra step of 
manually disseminating the information itself, rather than the hyperlink. 
While such a technique might not adequately protect confidential or 
secret information, it would likely help obscure information by reducing 
the number of people likely to disseminate it.80 While not perfect, this 
flexible approach could meaningfully help enable selective disclosure. 
2. “Privacy” Settings 
Some of the most common tools to help users produce obscurity are 
privacy settings.81 These settings, which generally allow Internet users to 
control the potential audience of their disclosures on a website, are often 
criticized as not protecting privacy at all because hundreds, if not 
thousands, can regularly still have access to “protected” disclosures.82 
This critique highlights the problems with relying upon 
conceptualizations of privacy to guide design. 
                                                     
78. It should be noted that there are privacy implications regarding the use of cookies, but these 
threats are better addressed by other strategies within privacy by design and are beyond the scope of 
this Article. See, e.g., Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy (University of California, 
Berkley, Working Paper, Aug. 10, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446862; Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans 
Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It (Working Paper, Sep. 29, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478214. 
79. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9. 
80. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 43.  
81. MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, REPUTATION 
MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA 29 (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
Reports/2010/Reputation-Management.aspx (finding that “[n]early three quarters (71%) of social 
networking users ages 18-29 have changed the privacy settings on their profile to limit what they 
share with others online”). 
82. See, e.g., Loporcaro v. City of New York, No. 100406/10, 2012 WL 1231021, at *7 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 2012) (“When a person creates a Facebook account, he or she may be found to have 
consented to the possibility that personal information might be shared with others, notwithstanding 
his or her privacy settings, as there is no guarantee that the pictures and information posted thereon, 
whether personal or not, will not be further broadcast and made available to other members of the 
public.”). 
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These technologies are likely better understood as “obscurity 
settings.” They help the user hide from search engines and control who 
accesses their personal information, two of the most important factors of 
our conceptualization of online obscurity. Previous research supports the 
assertion that Internet users utilize privacy settings for numerous reasons 
such as propriety, audience management, and obscurity.83 These settings 
can serve as bedrock technologies to enable obscurity and would likely 
be a staple for obscurity by design for social technologies. 
3. Search Blockers 
Because one of the main factors that enables obscurity is search 
invisibility, technologies that keep websites from being indexed by 
search engines are highly effective ways to design for obscurity. 
Previously discussed technologies such as password systems, privacy 
settings, and paywall-like technologies serve dual purposes of restricting 
access as well as keeping certain pieces of information from being 
cataloged by search engines.84 
However, other technologies can also serve this function. The 
robot.txt file85 is a simple and effective way for websites to indicate non-
participation in search engines.86 Search invisibility can be woven into 
the design of social technologies. For example, the popular blog creation 
tool Tumblr, allows users to hide their blogs from search engines.87 On 
the settings page for any particular blog, users can reverse this result by 
checking a box to indicate the user’s desire to “[a]llow search engines to 
index your blog.”88 
Designers might also consider offering various levels of search engine 
obfuscation, where only certain aspects of a profile or website are placed 
into search. Designers could make information searchable only at the 
                                                     
83. See, e.g., Stutzman & Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9. 
84. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9. 
85. According to Google, “A robots.txt file restricts access to your site by search engine robots 
that crawl the web. These bots are automated, and before they access pages of a site, they check to 
see if a robots.txt file exists that prevents them from accessing certain pages.” Block or Remove 
Pages Using a Robot.txt File, GOOGLE.COM, http://support.google.com/webmasters/bin/ 
answer.py?hl=en&answer=156449 (last visited Apr. 25, 2013). 
86. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 57, at 102 (“Today, nearly all Web programmers know 
robots.txt is the way in which sites can signal their intentions to robots, and these intentions are 
voluntarily respected by every major search engine across differing cultures and legal 
jurisdictions.”). 
87. See, e.g., Ashley Poland, Can You Restrict Ages on Tumblr?, EHOW (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.ehow.com/info_8665566_can-restrict-ages-tumblr.html. 
88. Id. 
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site level but remain invisible to general search engines. Search engine 
optimization techniques could be inverted to lower the placement of 
certain results, a sort of search engine diminishment. Any combination 
of technology and strategy to diminish or erase search engine visibility 
of information would count as a valid implementation of obscurity by 
design. 
4.  De-Identifying Tools 
Facial recognition technology is evolving rapidly.89 It is only a matter 
of time before individuals in photographs and videos online can be 
automatically identified.90 “Augmented reality,” that is, “a live, direct or 
indirect, view of a physical, real-world environment whose elements are 
augmented by computer-generated sensory input such as sound, video, 
graphics or GPS data,” will continue to find its way into social 
technologies.91 The identities of individuals in online media are often 
obscure because they are not included in the search results for the 
individuals’ names. Post hoc identification of these individuals would 
destroy the obscurity they enjoyed with regard to these videos and 
images. Thus, any technology that frustrated facial recognition and other 
identification tools would effectuate obscurity by design. 
For example, Google has announced plans to implement a technology 
that allows users to blur the faces of those appearing in videos before 
posting them to YouTube.92 The tool has been envisioned as another 
option for dealing with privacy complaints submitted by people depicted 
in another user’s videos. In addition to the more severe consequence of 
video deletion due to privacy complaints, video creators will also have 
the option to blur the complainant’s face, which will allow the videos to 
remain on YouTube.93 
While face-blurring might still leave individuals subject to 
identification in some contexts, this technique could have two positive 
                                                     
89. See, e.g., Megan Geuss, Facebook Facial Recognition: Its Quiet Rise and Dangerous Future, 
PCWORLD (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/226228/Facerec.html. 
90. See id.; Acquisti et al., supra note 71; Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, Why Facebook’s Facial 
Recognition is Creepy, PCWORLD (June 8, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/229742/ 
why_facebooks_facial_recognition_is_creepy.html. 
91. Augmented Reality, MASHABLE, http://mashable.com/follow/topics/augmented-reality/ (last 
visited May 1, 2012); see also Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The 
Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676 (2012). 
92. See Thomas Claburn, YouTube Tool Blurs Faces to Protect Privacy, INFO. WEEK (Mar. 29, 
2012), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/privacy/232700524. 
93. Id. 
07 - Hartzog Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2013  1:55 PM 
2013] OBSCURITY BY DESIGN 407 
 
outcomes for obscurity: (1) only those with external knowledge of 
individuals with blurred faces would likely be able to identify them, 
effectively protecting the individual from recognition by most strangers, 
and (2) blurred faces will frustrate facial recognition technologies. As 
such, these technologies would help implement obscurity by design. 
5. Passwords and Encryption 
Some technologies, such as password systems and encryption, can 
clearly obscure disclosures because these tools can significantly restrict 
outsider access and thus raise the transactional cost of finding 
information. Indeed, these technologies can often protect more than the 
obscurity of information—they can keep information a secret that is 
unknown or unseen by others. While designers should always be willing 
to consider these powerful tools, they should be mindful regarding their 
implementation for the front end of social technologies (as opposed to 
back-end or in-transit uses like “https” or encrypting electronic 
messages, which are important aspects of privacy by design).94 Too 
many restrictions on the accessibility of disclosures might unduly inhibit 
social interaction and frustrate the purpose of the technology. 
B. Policies 
Not all technology design decisions relate to the creation and 
implementation of tools. The creation and protection of obscurity can 
also be facilitated by rules that explicitly allow or discourage certain 
behavior. Terms of use and policies can allow users to create their own 
obscurity, for example by using a pseudonym, as well as prevent other 
social technology users from engaging in obscurity-eroding behavior, 
such as scraping data from websites. These policies generally fall into 
two categories: behavioral restrictions, which are largely imposed to 
govern the user’s behavior in relation to the technology, and community 
guidelines, which are imposed as the “rules of the road” between users 
within an online community. 
1. Contractual Restrictions on User Behavior 
Terms of use agreements in technologies like social media commonly 
                                                     
94. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, A Privacy Manifesto in Code: What if Your Emails Never Went 
to Gmail and Twitter Couldn’t See Your Tweets?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/12/04/a-privacy-manifesto-in-code-what-if-your-
emails-never-went-to-gmail-and-twitter-couldnt-see-your-tweets/255414/. 
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include restrictions on user behavior. These restrictions, such as 
prohibitions on scraping data and requesting one’s user name and 
password, can prevent other individuals (and bots) from diminishing a 
technology user’s obscurity. Other policies, such as the requirement that 
social media users list their real name, can frustrate a user’s obscurity 
protections. Policies that discourage activities that erode obscurity and 
encourage obscurity-friendly behavior should be considered an 
implementation of obscurity by design. Because lack of identification is 
a major factor in online obscurity, designers should construct policies 
and technologies that allow for pseudonyms, name variants, and/or the 
use of multiple profiles to represent multiple facets of identity. Indeed, 
Google+, the search giant’s social media platform, has already modified 
its terms to allow the use of some pseudonyms.95 This development 
occurred as part of the so-called “nym-wars,” which brought attention to 
the importance of pseudonymity.96 Other social network sites have “real 
name” policies that require strong identification of site members through 
norms, and sometimes through enforcement action.97 These policies are 
controversial as the requirement of real names can disenfranchise a wide 
range of users (e.g., victims of abuse, political opposition) who face 
threats if they speak publicly with their “real names.”98 Some users 
simply want to bifurcate their online identity by creating two different 
social media profiles.99 Multiple profiles produce obscurity by de-linking 
aspects of an individual’s identity. Yet this practice is also prohibited by 
some social network websites, including Facebook.100 Real name 
policies and prohibitions on multiple profiles can help verify one’s 
online identity, but these practices significantly diminish obscurity by 
                                                     
95. See Eva Galperin, Google+ and Pseudonyms: A Step in the Right Direction, Not the End of 
the Road, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/ 
google-pseudonyms-step-right-direction-not-end-road. 
96. See Eva Galperin, 2011 in Review: Nymwars, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 26, 
2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/12/2011-review-nymwars. 
97. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ 
terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Rights] (“Facebook users 
provide their real names and information, and we need your help to keep it that way. Here are some 
commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your 
account: . . . You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook . . . .”). 
98. See Jillian C. York, A Case for Pseudonyms, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 29, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/case-pseudonyms. 
99. See, e.g., Stutzman and Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9 (finding that users often 
use multiple profiles for “personal” and “professional” separation). 
100. Statement of Rights, supra note 97 (“Here are some commitments you make to us relating to 
registering and maintaining the security of your account: . . . You will not create more than one 
personal account.”). 
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design. 
Restrictions on revealing one’s username and password can also help 
create obscurity, as well as security, by functioning as a non-
technological burden on accessing information. One of the easier ways 
of accessing a user’s social media profile is to do so directly via requests 
for one’s username and password. Third-party requests for social media 
user’s passwords are seemingly on the rise.101 However, as part of the 
registration process, Facebook and other social network sites require 
promises such as “[y]ou will not share your password . . . let anyone else 
access your account, or do anything else that might jeopardize the 
security of your account.”102 
Designers can protect the obscurity of their users’ information by 
prohibiting scraping.103 In the obscurity context, scraping restrictions are 
a form of access control against automated information harvesting.104 
Essentially, these restrictions mandate that, for most purposes, only 
humans can access online information, as opposed to bots. This 
restriction helps produce obscurity by limiting the aggregation and 
further dissemination to “manual” methods, which are more time 
consuming and less likely to present systematic risks to privacy. 
Information harvesting typically results in aggregation of information, 
which associates information that was previously separate. This 
separation prevented certain kinds of presupposition crucial to 
understanding individuals and information.105 In other words, 
                                                     
101. For example, in September 2007, a cheerleading coach at Pearl High School in Mississippi 
allegedly required the members of her cheerleading squad to reveal the usernames and passwords of 
their Facebook accounts. Brian Stewart, Student Files Lawsuit After Coach Distributed Private 
Facebook Content, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1938; cf. David L. Hudson, Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses 
Barred from Eyeing Students’, Workers’ Social Media, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2012, 3:10 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
site_unseen_schools_bosses_barred_from_eyeing_students_workers_social_media. 
102. Statement of Rights, supra note 97. 
103. See, e.g., id. (“You will not collect users’ content or information, or otherwise access 
Facebook, using automated means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without our 
prior permission.”). 
104. Automated information harvesting by third parties also threatens individuals’ obscurity and 
is typically governed via terms of use. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 
(1st Cir. 2003) (“Many webpages contain lengthy limiting conditions, including limitations on the 
use of scrapers.”). “Web Scraping is the process of taking html or data from the web and organizing 
that data into an organized format . . . . Common uses for web scraping is the gathering and retrieval 
of large amounts of information that would be to unwieldy to gather by hand.” Web Scraping 
Definition, EXTRACTINGDATA.COM, http://www.extractingdata.com/web%20scraping.htm (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2010). 
105. See, e.g., Goffman, supra note 45. 
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aggregating information can often clarify it, which makes that 
information more obvious and less obscure. 
A number of social technologies have already incorporated this 
design principle. Facebook mandates that visitors “will not collect users’ 
content or information, or otherwise access Facebook, using automated 
means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without our 
prior permission.”106 It goes on to state that “[i]f you collect information 
from users, you will: obtain their consent, make it clear you (and not 
Facebook) are the one collecting their information, and post a privacy 
policy explaining what information you collect and how you will use 
it.”107 
2. Community Guidelines 
While “behavior restrictions” provide rules for the relationship 
between the user and the website, terms of use agreements and website 
policies also have the opportunity to serve as a mediator of conduct 
between the users of online communities. These “rules of the road” for 
online social interaction are often called “community guidelines,”108 
and—in addition to contractually restricting behavior—they can 
potentially help set the normative expectations for online communities. 
These rules of the road need not be in the terms of use agreement to 
be effective from a design perspective. Indeed, because virtually nobody 
reads the terms of use, inserting community guidelines into boilerplate 
will all but assure their ineffectiveness.109 Instead, these guidelines 
should be made prominent at the point of disclosure to gently remind 
members of the community of what the normatively expected behavior 
is. For example, a small textual box next to a status-posting tool in a 
social network site might incorporate language from the website’s terms 
of use, such as, “Remember, this is a community that relies upon 
discretion” or “Let’s keep what we learn here between members of the 
                                                     
106. Statement of Rights, supra note 97. 
107. Id. 
108. See, e.g., Flickr Community Guidelines, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/help/guidelines/ 
(last visited May 1, 2012); MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms?pm_cmp=ed_footer (last visited June 25, 2009); The Twitter 
Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules (last visited May 1, 
2012); YouTube Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/ 
community_guidelines (last visited May 1, 2012) (“We’re not asking for the kind of respect 
reserved for nuns, the elderly, and brain surgeons. We mean don’t abuse the site. Every cool new 
community feature on YouTube involves a certain level of trust. We trust you to be responsible, and 
millions of users respect that trust. Please be one of them.”).  
109. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 (2011). 
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community.” 
Community guidelines should not be in legalese. They should be 
short and easy to understand.110 Designers could experiment with 
various levels of formality and injunctions of humor to determine the 
most effective way to inform users of the rules. Designers also have the 
option of implementing the guidelines normatively or incorporating 
them into their terms of use as part of a contractually binding agreement. 
For example, the online photo community of Flickr provides very 
simple community guidelines, many of which enhance obscurity.111 
Under “What not to do,” Flickr reminds users, “Don’t forget the 
children,” saying “If you would hesitate to show your photos or videos 
to a child, your mum, or Uncle Bob, that means you need to set the 
appropriate content filter setting. If you don’t, your account will be 
moderated and possibly deleted by Flickr staff.”112 The content filter is a 
technological control that can affect access and is a great way to blend 
design tools to create obscurity. The website also uses humor to enforce 
civility and respect for the community, stating, “Don’t be creepy. You 
know the guy. Don’t be that guy.”113 
C. Behavioral Interventions 
Modern behavioral economics and social psychology have 
demonstrated that small design decisions can have a significant impact 
on an individual’s behavior.114 To effectuate obscurity by design, we 
recommend drawing from these disciplines to provide instruction on 
how, in the parlance of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, to “nudge” 
users toward obscurity-friendly practices.115 We refer to design decisions 
made to encourage obscurity-friendly practices as behavioral 
interventions. 
                                                     
110. Cf. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 J. 
L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008). 
111. See Flickr Community Guidelines, supra note 108. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011); CHOICES, VALUES, AND 
FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tverskey, eds., 2000); see also Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or 
Notice? (Feb. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217013. 
115. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008). Thaler and Sunstein conceptualize a “nudge” as “any 
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a nudge, the 
intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates.” Id. 
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These behavioral interventions could work in tandem with or in place 
of technologies and policies to gently enhance user obscurity in social 
technologies without mandating conduct or precluding certain kinds of 
activity. It is important to emphasize that, consistent with the thesis of 
this Article, these interventions are offered not as excessive protections 
to limit user behavior, but rather as clarifications and corrective 
measures that help users understand and effectuate the true and desired 
state of their online communications. 
1. Defaults 
There may be no more central tenet to obscurity by design and 
privacy by design as a whole than the importance of privacy-friendly 
default settings.116 Indeed, the issue of defaults for consumers and 
technology users is important in other areas of privacy law.117 The 
reason why the default setting is such a critical design decision is that 
individuals will usually stick with whatever the default choice is, even 
when the default is less advantageous or more harmful than the non-
default options.118 This power of inertia and general reluctance of 
individuals to alter default choices has been called “status quo bias.”119 
Default settings can even be seen as an implicit endorsement from the 
default setter that the settings are desirable.120 Thus, it is extremely 
important to consider the proper default setting for social technologies 
and implement the most responsible choice. 
We have argued that, for most social technologies, obscurity is the 
natural context for the disclosure of personal information. Consequently, 
any organization seeking to adhere to the principles of obscurity by 
design should set their default choices for users in the most obscurity-
friendly way available. For example, if a social technology offers 
privacy settings, the settings should, at a minimum, default to render 
                                                     
116. See CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1; CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1. 
116. See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2. 
117. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193 (1998); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of 
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999). 
118. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 8.  
119. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
120. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer 
Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 603 (2006) (“[P]eople believe 
defaults convey information on how people should act.”). 
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disclosures invisible from search and limit other user’s access in some 
significant way (i.e., not offer unfettered access). 
2. Feedback 
Designing feedback mechanisms into social technologies might be 
one of the most powerful behavioral interventions available to 
implement obscurity by design. Feedback can be effective for a number 
of reasons, including helping make risks more salient and appealing to 
individuals’ desire for conformity.121 
One kind of feedback that might be effective for designers could be a 
form of what Professor Ryan Calo calls “visceral notice,” notice that is 
visceral “in the sense of changing the consumers understanding by 
leveraging the very experience of a product or service.”122 Feedback 
could be categorized as “showing,” or “tailoring notice very specifically 
to the company’s engagement with the exact individual.”123 Calo states 
“[t]echnology and clever design create the possibility of tailoring 
anecdotes to individual consumers, thereby showing them what is 
specifically relevant to them, instead of describing generally what might 
be.”124 
As an example, Calo describes how Mozilla, the designer of the 
popular Firefox browser, “shows” users their privacy practices by 
providing the user feedback on what information is collected by the 
browser. 
Consistent with standard legal practice, Mozilla provides a 
                                                     
121. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms 
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 613 (2000) (“The tendency of individuals to conform—a 
phenomenon psychologists call ‘social influence’—is pervasive: diners prefer to patronize the 
restaurants that they think other diners will patronize, and citizens to vote for the candidates for 
whom they think others will vote; teenage girls are more likely to become pregnant when they see 
that others are having babies, and adults more likely to go on welfare when they become acquainted 
with others who are on the dole.”); Jonathan Klick and Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of 
Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1629 (2006) (“The main 
vehicle to greater decision-making competence is alteration in existing psychological states such 
that later psychological states possess more reliable knowledge about what ends are most valued 
and how best to achieve those ends. Outcome feedback and verbal feedback serve as the main 
mechanisms for change between earlier and later psychological states.”). 
122. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1027, 1033 (2012). 
123. Id. at 1042. For preliminary results regarding an experiment that measures, among other 
things, “showing” as a notice technique, see Victoria Groom & M. Ryan Calo, Reversing the 
Privacy Paradox: An Experimental Study (Sept. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1993125. 
124. Calo, supra note 122, at 1042.  
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privacy policy and terms of use that explain, generally, what 
information Mozilla might collect and how it might use that 
information. About one study, Mozilla says: “We will 
periodically collect data on the browser’s basic performance for 
one week . . . .” Prior to transmitting user information from the 
user’s computer to Mozilla’s servers, however, Mozilla also 
shows users a report of what information has actually been 
collected and asks them to review and approve it. Thus, users 
actually see a specific, relevant instance of collection and decide 
to consent on this basis.125 
Calo concludes, “Executed well, showing describes what has actually 
occurred, thereby embedding information about the company’s practices 
in the consumer experience of the produce or service—similar to the 
way we might best learn the rules of a game by playing it.”126 
Social technologies provide abundant opportunities for feedback 
through “showing” users aspects of their social network or interactivity 
that might encourage obscurity-friendly practices. For example, showing 
users the size of their potential audience or five randomly selected 
“friends” at the point of disclosure might help users better understand 
the scope of the contemplated disclosure and, thus, the potential 
consequences of communication. This salience could lead to a disclosure 
to a smaller audience or within the confines of certain groups or privacy 
settings. 
Some social technologies have already utilized this technique. For 
example, the professional social network site LinkedIn shows users who 
recently viewed their profile.127 Shown in proximity to incipient but 
unpublished disclosures, these design features could serve to enhance 
obscurity-friendly practices such as encouraging users to be less explicit 
regarding personal information or to obfuscate the identity of the subject 
of the disclosure. 
Designers could also combine our innate desire for conformity with 
feedback from the user’s social graph to encourage obscurity friendly 
practices.128 Although human beings might think they are uninfluenced 
by the behavior of their peers, empirical research demonstrates that 
people often simply conform to the behavior of others.129 Thaler and 
                                                     
125. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
126. Id. at 1044. 
127. Who’s Viewed Your Profile?, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=pop/ 
pop_more_wvmp (last visited Apr. 27, 2012). 
128. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9. 
129. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the 
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Sunstein proposed that if many people within a particular community or 
“in group” are engaging in some kind of positive behavior (such as 
exercising), merely mentioning that fact to other members of the group 
might be able to produce significant changes in the other members’ 
behavior.130 
Given our tendency to look to other users of social technology for 
behavioral cues, designers could use statistics to encourage obscurity-
friendly behavior. For example, designers could show users how many 
of their friends have utilized the privacy settings. Facebook already 
leverages the user’s social graph by displaying how many mutual friends 
two “unconnected” users have.131 Designers can implement these same 
kinds of cues to enhance obscurity at a low cost. 
3. Content, Ordering, and Placement of Signals 
Language and interactive features of websites often carry more 
weight than designers might intend. Organizations seeking to implement 
obscurity by design should be mindful that small changes in the 
prominence and number of instances of obscurity-related signals such as 
language emphasizing obscurity, privacy settings, options to hide from 
search engines and pseudonym policies, can have a significant effect on 
obscurity-friendly practices and user decisions. 
Individuals often rely too much on a particular trait or piece of 
information when making decisions.132 These overvalued pieces of 
information have been referred to as “anchors” because they become the 
starting points toward which decisions become biased.133 Effective 
obscurity by design should optimize the placement of language and 
signals during the average user experience because they might become 
anchors for users and thus serve as behavioral interventions. 
One form of this tactic has come to be known as a “just-in-time” alert 
and is supported as a valid “privacy by design” technique by the FTC.134 
                                                     
United States, 111 Q. J. ECON. 277 (1996); Bruce Sacerdote, Peer Effects with Random Assignment: 
Results for Dartmouth Roommates, 116 Q. J. ECON. 681 (2001). 
130. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 60. 
131. See What Are Friendship Pages?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
220629401299124/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
132. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); cf. Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, The Limits of 
Anchoring, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 223 (1994). 
133. See Chapman & Johnson, supra note 132. 
134. See FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 11, at 15–16; see also Lauren Gelman, 
FTC Recommends Best Practices for Mobile Privacy, BLURRYEDGE STRATEGIES (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://blurryedge.com/blurryedge-strategies/2013/02/ftc-recommends-best-practices-for-mobile-
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According to the Commission, “[p]roviding such a disclosure at the 
point in time when it matters to consumers, just prior to the collection of 
such information by apps, will allow users to make informed choices 
about whether to allow the collection of such information.”135 The tech 
giant Apple has deployed just-in-time-disclosures in some aspects of its 
iOS6 operating system to obtain affirmative express consent for 
collection of personal information.136 
With respect to just-in-time disclosures for social technologies, 
companies could introduce privacy settings early in the profile creation 
process and again at the point of disclosure. Designers could make the 
settings or language of privacy visible in the toolbar or the top of the 
homepage to increase awareness throughout the user experience. 
Companies could emphasize that pseudonyms are allowed before a 
profile name is chosen. These strategies could increase the likelihood 
that obscurity is a relevant anchor for users as they go about the process 
of selecting both content and audience. 
Prominent and frequent obscurity-related signals could also combat 
people’s tendency to assess risk using the most conveniently accessible 
example. This phenomenon has been labeled the “availability 
heuristic.”137 Reminding individuals of the obscurity in which their 
disclosures exist could help them properly gauge when to disclose 
further and when to curtail sharing. 
Finally, prominent signals that remind users of the negative 
consequences of losing obscurity might help individuals be less forgetful 
of their potential audience. For example, users seeking to post a 
profanity-laden status update rife with personal information might be 
gently reminded that their co-workers, employer, or even their 
grandmother will be able to view the post. Users could then be given the 
option to tailor their update to a more discreet group.138 Or designers 
could include very simple reminders at the point of disclosure explaining 
to users that their post will be available to anyone via search engines. 
                                                     
privacy.html.  
135. FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 11, at 15. 
136. See id. at 16. 
137. Tversky & Daniel, supra note 132, at 1127 (“There are situations in which people assess the 
frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences 
can be brought to mind.”). 
138. Longtime users of word-processing software Microsoft Word might analogize such a 
guidance tool to “Clippy,” the anthropomorphized paper-clip who asked if the Word users would 
like help when recognized user behavior associated with specific tasks. Of course, like Clippy, 
obscurity-reminders should also be easily disabled by the user. 
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4. Carefully Crafted Language 
Finally, any effective implementation of obscurity by design should 
reflect an understanding of the power of framing to influence user 
decisions. The way that an issue like obscurity is framed by the 
designer’s choice of language could have a significant effect on a user’s 
disclosure decisions. Robert Entman stated, “To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described.”139 In essence, “Frames 
highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of a 
communication, thereby elevating them in salience.”140 
One of the most widely cited examples of the power of framing 
involves an experiment by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. The 
experiment involved a significant number of participants who were each 
presented with statistically identical treatment options for a hypothetical 
disease. The treatment options, however, were framed differently to 
individual participants in terms of either likely deaths versus probable 
lives saved. The experiment showed that a significant number of 
participants’ understanding of the problem, as well as their ultimate 
choice of treatment, changed depending on how the treatment option 
was framed.141 
Obscurity can easily be framed as a positive or negative as well as a 
gain or a loss. Social technologies are designed for interaction and, as 
previously discussed, some might view obscurity as a hindrance to 
socialization. Thus, organizations seeking to implement obscurity by 
design could proactively address the conceptualization by framing 
obscurity as, we believe correctly, the natural state for most online 
socialization, as well as something to be “lost” if not protected. 
When appropriate, framing obscurity as something the user already 
has and is subject to losing allows designers to leverage people’s natural 
tendency to overvalue things they already have.142 Thaler and Sunstein 
wrote, “People hate losses . . . . Roughly speaking, losing something 
                                                     
139. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. COMM. 
51, 52 (1993) (emphasis omitted). 
140. Id. at 53. 
141. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984). 
142. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsh & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991). 
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makes you twice as miserable as gaining the same thing makes you 
happy.”143 This use of framing will aid users in maintaining the 
obscurity of their communications. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that while design-based solutions to protect 
privacy are promising, current proposals such as privacy by design have 
failed to tackle the social aspect of the Internet. This reluctance to tackle 
the “front end” of design-based solutions is understandable. The social 
web is messy, unpredictable, and amorphous. Mandating the inclusion of 
privacy practices into the design of social technologies can be 
problematic given that the goal of such technologies involves sharing 
personal information. 
This Article has proposed a new design strategy for social 
technologies, which involves winnowing down from the unhelpful and 
vague conceptualization of privacy to the narrower, more accurate and 
attainable concept of obscurity. Information is obscure online if it exists 
in a context missing one or more key factors that are essential to 
discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these factors as 
part of a non-exhaustive and flexible list: (1) search visibility, (2) 
unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. The presence of 
these factors diminishes obscurity, and their absence enhances it. Those 
seeking to “bake” obscurity into the front-end of social technologies can 
do so through technologies, organizational policies, and behavioral 
interventions. 
Where the pursuit of “privacy” in design often seems like a quest for 
near-perfect protection, the goal of designing for obscurity is that it be 
good enough for most contexts or to accommodate a user’s specific 
needs. As the natural state for many online social communications, 
obscurity is the logical locus for the front end design of social 
technologies. Obscurity by design utilizes the full potential of design-
based solutions to protect privacy and serve as a roadmap for 
organizations and regulators who seek to confront the vexing problems 
and contradictions inherent in social technologies. 
                                                     
143. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 33. 
